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A socio-ecological approach to strategy  
Ramirez and Selsky (2014) contrasted conventional strategic approaches derived from neoclassical economics 
with a socio-ecological approach to strategy, focusing on the causal textures theory of organizational 
environments (CTT), to propose that CTT helps strategic planners to better engage the unpredictable 
uncertainty that characterizes turbulent environments.  
This socio-ecological approach to strategic planning is grounded in an open-systems view of an organization’s 
strategic situation, where the core unit of analysis is the shared field of inter-organizational action (Lewin, 
1952). 
According to Emery and Trist (1965), causal textures theory (CTT) as a part of the social ecology school that 
studies environmental types, helps strategists to analyse how a system such as an organization and its 
environment (composed of forces, factors, actors, interactions) interact.  
The actors with whom a focal actor interacts are in its more immediate “transactional” environment — which 
can involve actors in several industries. These interactions in the transaction environment are in turn situated 
in a broader “contextual environment”, made up of factors which the focal actor cannot influence.  
Several interacting organizations, their shared environments, and the connexions that link them jointly 
constitute a “field”. 
Emery and Trist (1965) demonstrated that the environment has a distinct set of “lawful” relations. CTT uses the 
symbol L to denote links within an organization, within the environment and between them. It uses the symbol 
1 to represent the organization, and the symbol 2 to represent the environment. Consequently, the two-way 
links between an organization and its environment involve transactional relations: planning (inside-out) L12 
relations, and learning (outside-in) L21 relations. Links within an organization are L11, those within the 
environment are L22 (Emery and Trist, 1965; Selsky et al., 2007). Organizations act in relation to the 
environment — and are influenced by the environment — through L12, L21 relations. In CTT, the L22 
distinguishes the transactional and contextual environments from each other (Ramírez and Seslky, 2014). 
Emery and Trist (1965) proposed four causal textures of the environment, distinguished by the salience, 
complexity and uncertainty of L22 links for the organizations in the field.  
- In a “placid random” (type I) causal texture, resources, goals and noxiants are randomly distributed in 
the field. This corresponds to “perfect market” conditions. A successful strategic stance is 
characterized by experience-based tactics and local optimisation, L11 being the most salient 
connections.  
- In a “placid clustered” (type II) causal texture, resources, goals and/or noxiants are located in 
advantageous positions, corresponding to conditions of imperfect competition with market failure. A 
successful strategic stance is characterized by securing or accessing “high ground” locations, attending 
to distinctive competence and resources; L11 and L21 are the most salient connections. 
- In a “disturbed reactive” (type III) causal texture, the structure of the field corresponds to an oligopoly 
with similar organisations in competition. “Game-based” strategies are used, rapid decision making to 
take an advantage over other actors sharing the same field are characteristic of a causal texture where 
L11, L21 and L12 are the most salient connections. 
- In a “turbulent” causal texture (type IV), the whole common shared ground is in motion, L22 
connections become uncertain and changing. Distinctions between L12-L21 and L22 begin to break 
down. There is no survival for systems acting alone, collaborative strategies among dissimilar 
organisations in a field are necessary.  
McCann and Selsky (1984) highlighted that the experience of turbulence is subjective. If the perception that the 
links managed by the organization (L11/21/12) are under pressure and may become insufficiently resilient due 
to changing broader contextual environmental forces to maintain its position or its viability, then turbulence is 
experienced. It follows that an environment perceived by some organizations as turbulent, may be perceived 
by other organisations as disturbed or placid.  
Ramirez and Selsky (2014) suggest that the distinctive contribution of the social ecology school is to “(…) 
examine unpredictable uncertainty as 1) a contextual-level phenomenon, produced in a field of tightly coupled 
interactions which can produce unexpected bifurcations (…) and field-level unintended consequences; and 2) 
as a distinguishing property of a distinct “texture” of the environment”. Due to these characteristics, CTT 
articulates high-level strategic stances that strategists in organizations can find helpful to pursue in each 
texture. 
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Strategizing in a turbulent environment 
Ramirez and Selsky (2014) suggested that neoclassical based strategic planning processes (e.g. Porter 1985) are 
better suited to pre-turbulent causal textures (types I-III) than to turbulent conditions. For instance, Selsky et 
al. (2007) established that effective strategizing in a turbulent environment looks first to decrease this 
turbulence, demanding a focus at the level of the field instead than on the single organisation. They saw this 
move as being best accomplished through collaboration among functionally dissimilar types of organisations. 
CTT holds that this inter-organisational cross-sectoral collaboration aims to create enough combined capacity 
to cope with the macro forces emanating from the L22, helping the field as a whole to become less turbulent 
while also making the strategic situation of each field member more tractable (Selsky et al. 2007). 
Ramirez and Selsky (2014) argued that collaboration does not replace industry competition in firms’ 
transactional environments constitutive of the neoclassical approach. It complements competition with new, 
field-level kinds of strategic initiatives. Thus, stances in relation to turbulence are often complicated blends of 
competition and cooperation, including coopetition (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996); but also combining 
each as separate forms of interaction occurring synchronously. One can compete with some actors and 
collaborate with others.  
These authors rendered explicit three principles in CTT that had remained implicit; and associated them with 
three corresponding strategic stances for turbulent environments.  
  
CTT 
Principle 
Description Strategic 
Stance 
Description Field effects Leading 
linkage 
Transition 
principle 
Turbulence is not a stable 
state of a field, but a state 
that manifests itself in 
strong moments and which 
can then dissipate - or 
accelerate further 
Preparation: 
Stocking up 
resources 
Building reserves of resources 
in times of no or low 
turbulence, enabling these 
organizations to invest those 
resources to strengthen 
themselves or to sit out or 
hide away when turbulence 
increases. 
System can 
reinforce an 
existing region 
with 
additional 
capacity 
L11 
Heterogenei
ty principle  
Turbulence is not 
necessarily homogenous 
across a whole field, it may 
be more salient in some 
parts of a field than in 
others.  
Relocating: 
escaping via 
migration or 
defence 
It involves organizations 
migrating to locations in the 
field that are shielded from 
the worst impacts of 
turbulence 
System can 
escape to a 
less turbulent 
region 
L21 
Subjectivity 
principle  
While turbulence may be 
an objective condition 
(“texture”) of a field, it is 
experienced differently by 
particular organizations in 
the field, depending on 
their “perceived adaptive 
capacity” to cope. 
Reinventing 
collaboratio
n 
It involves enriching 
organizations and their 
counterparts with relevant 
knowledge about the possible 
unfolding of the turbulence 
they expect or are beginning 
to experience so they can 
negotiate and invent new 
roles and relationships 
System can 
create a 
higher-
capacity 
region with 
others 
L12 
Table I: CTT Principles and Strategic Stances (source: adapted from Ramirez and Selsky, 2014) 
 
Therefore, collaborative interactions enjoy a higher profile as integral components of corporate and business 
strategic planning than in the neoclassical approach.  
The emphasis of collaboration is not within the “industry”, nor on horizontal partnering with competitors, nor 
on vertical integration ventures with value-chain partners. Instead, here collaboration involves a much more 
diverse set of actors and stakeholders comprising the broader fields in which organizations operate to together 
engage contextual level factors that affect or may affect all actors in a field. 
Socio-ecologically based strategic planning acknowledges commercial and competitive challenges, but is more 
sensitized to macro level disruptions and unpredictable uncertainty. It suggests that, when unpredictable 
uncertainty becomes a more central concern of strategic planners, the strategic situation has shifted into a 
different, turbulent “texture”, which calls for a different mode of strategic planning. This seems particularly 
relevant to the current situation in the Swiss Watchmaking Industry, as we see below.  
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Method 
Based on six longitudinal, case studies (Yin, 1994) of independent watchmaking companies and reflective 
observation (Schön, 1984), we empirically examine the application of contrasting strategic stances and 
principles comparing competitive strategy with the socio-ecological approach in the Swiss Watchmaking field. 
We used multiple data collection methods: primary data collected with c-level decision-makers, influencers and 
interpreters through interviews, onsite visits and participation at professional gatherings, and secondary data 
from internal company reports, consulting and banking reports, the relevant specialized press and the web as a 
whole. Historical sources have also been used at length. Two co-authors also have managerial and consulting 
roles in the industry, being able to take a reflective stance on their roles.  
 
Turbulence in the Swiss Watchmaking Field 
The Swiss Watchmaking Industry is a leading force in the European Creative Industries. It is the world leader’s 
exporter of watches in terms of value with exports of CHF21 billion in 2014, representing 7% of Swiss Exports 
(FHS, 2015). The field is composed of the watchmakers, their value chain partners, plus several actors and 
stakeholders in the creative industries, media, banking, insurance, real estate, non-governmental organizations 
and education institutions.  
The industry is dominated by large groups to which most of the major watch brands belong: Swatch, owner of 
18 brands and a large part of the manufacture of watch movements; Richemont, owner of 13 watch brands; 
and Rolex which owns the Tudor and Rolex brands. These first three were single-handedly responsible for 47% 
of the total turnover of the watchmaking industry in 2014 (Vontobel, 2015). The fourth major group is the 
French group LVMH. Alongside these four groups there are several independent family companies, like Patek 
Philippe, Audemars Piguet, Chopard, Breitling and Bucherer.  
Hoffmann and Lecamp (2015) show that the current environment is increasingly complex for new entrants 
given the control of the manufacture of watch movement by the large groups. This phenomenon can be 
explained by the recent trend for large watchmaker groups to vertically integrate external suppliers and 
subcontractors, bringing them in-house. Swatch Group started this process in the late 1980s and the 
movement gained pace during the 1990s with other groups, like Rolex, Richemont and LVMH joining in.  
This wave of acquisitions enhanced the value of those suppliers who possessed strategic expertise, in the 
production of cases, dials, hands and hairsprings. The acquisition of these specialist workshops by large groups 
meant it was near impossible for smaller brands to obtain supplies and they were forced to find new sources 
which were increasingly expensive.  
Particularly, the decision some years ago by the Swatch Group to cut the delivery of certain parts and 
mechanical movements to third-party brands had a profound effect on the watchmaking industry as a whole. 
An automatic movement is basically made up of the ébauche (the unassembled basis of the movement with all 
its components) and the assortment (the associated regulating components of the movement). Since its 
creation, the Swatch Group has enjoyed a largely commanding position in the mechanical movement market of 
ébauches and assortments. In 2002, ETA, the company that manufactured ébauches and complete movements 
was bought up by Swatch Group which in 2006 decided to reduce, and then to permanently stop the delivery of 
ébauches to clients outside the group.  Given that nearly 80 per cent of all watch movements produced in 
Switzerland at that time were based on the ETA ébauche, this decision had severe consequences on many 
independent watch manufacturers. The Swiss Competition Commission (ComCo) was called in to investigate 
and an amicable settlement was reached; allowing deliveries to be phased out more gradually until 2010. Since 
2011, ébauches have no longer been delivered to companies outside the Swatch Group – which in effect was a 
fatal blow for many independent brands (Hoffmann and Lecamp, 2015).  
Furthermore, at the end of 2009, Swatch Group indicated that it would stop delivering all complete watch 
movements and assortments to external clients. In 2010, the ComCo was once again called upon and an 
investigation to determine whether Swatch Group’s decision constituted abuse of its commanding position was 
conducted the following year. The ComCo’s provisional measures stipulated that Swatch Group should 
continue to ensure delivery of movements and assortments to companies outside the group for the duration of 
the proceedings; with deliveries being officially reduced from 2012 (Hoffmann and Lecamp, 2015). 
Moreover, the planned hardening of conditions to obtain the label Swiss Made has been putting pressure on 
watchmaking independents, particularly those offering low and mid-range price level products. The draft 
legislation known as Swissness stated that in future the Swiss made label would only be awarded if at least 60 
per cent of production costs are to be incurred in Switzerland (compared to 50% before the legislation was to 
be enacted), a proposal that is currently being examined by the Swiss parliament (FHS, 2015).  
These developments in the transactional environmental were matched up by three important changes in the 
contextual environment. The Swiss National Bank decided early 2015 to unpeg the Swiss Franc to the Euro, 
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resulting in an immediate 10% revaluation of the Swiss Franc at the end of 2015, directly reducing the sale 
levels and profitability of Swiss companies. Then, the anti-graft campaign following Xi Jinping ascension to 
office in 2012 in China had a strong impact on purchases from Chinese clients of the products of Swiss watch-
making firms both in Hong Kong and abroad. Chinese consumers represented nearly 30% of the luxury market 
and Hong Kong has been the main export destination of Swiss watches (Bain and Altagamma, 2015). Figures 
from October 2015 indicate a 39% slump in shipments to Hong Kong on a year-on-year basis, the biggest 
decline in six years.  Thirdly, the emergence of ‘connected’ watches, like the Apple Watch, looms as a threat as 
consequential as the quartz mechanism in the past century to the established ‘disconnected’ offerings of the 
Swiss manufacturers. These changes combine to characterize the transition from a disturbed-reactive to a 
turbulent environment.  
 
A social-ecology strategy approach in the Swiss Watchmaking field 
We now assess the presence of the transition, heterogeneity and subjectivity principles in socio-ecological 
strategy and how a coopetition strategic stance fares in the context of the Swiss Watchmaking Industry.  
We find some evidence of the CTT transition principle. Turbulence was acute in the historical period following 
the development by a Swiss consortium of the electronic quartz calibre Beta 21 in the late 1960’s and 1970’s. 
Electronic watches offered a number of advantages in terms of precision, power reserve capabilities, 
sensitiveness to jolts and impacts, and cost. The quartz watch soon became a commodity and transformed 
mechanical watches into a niche category. Consequences were significant for Swiss watchmakers: between 
1975 and 1983, their share of the worldwide watch market dropped from 30 to 10 per cent. Swiss watchmakers 
eventually repositioned mechanical watches as premium products and Swatch integrated quartz in fashionable 
pieces, enabling the sector to resist and strengthen against Asian watchmakers like Seiko and Casio (Hayek, 
2014).  
It would appear that the current turbulent conditions will affect low and mid-range watch companies more 
strongly than high-end companies, particularly independent watchmakers. This we take as providing evidence 
of the heterogeneity principle. As demonstrated by Hoffmann and Lecamp (2015), HYT and MB&F are two 
watchmakers that have developed an innovative value constellation (Normann and Ramirez, 1993) resulting in 
more resilient capabilities. Thirdly, several independent watchmaking companies are particularly constrained in 
the current configuration, with diminished adaptive capacities to cope, which we interpret as providing 
evidence of the “subjectivity principle”. Examples include watchmakers Raymond Weil, Victorinox, Mondaine 
and Oris.  
As regards to the Ramirez and Selsky (2014) strategic stances, the acquisition of manufacturing companies by 
the large groups (eg Swatch Group, LVMH) can certainly be read as evidence of the preparation strategic 
stance. The Swissness legislation is an interesting coopetition example where influential actors in the field 
jointly lobby the Swiss government to change established rules in favor of those within the enclave (McCann 
and Selsky, 1984), who then can jointly preclude being adversely affected by turbulence because they are 
better able to meet the stricter regulations; whereas it makes it more turbulent for those external to it. This we 
take as manifesting the relocating strategic stance.  
 
Strategic Stance Example in the Swiss Watchmaking Field 
Preparation Acquisition of manufacturing companies by the large groups (e.g. Swatch) 
Relocating Swissness draft legislation 
Reinventing collaboration TAG Heuer Connected Watch developed with Intel and Google 
Table II: Strategic Stances in the Swiss Watchmaking Field  
 
Thirdly, the “reinventing collaboration” strategic stance seems particularly relevant regarding the radical 
innovation that the smartwatch represents. If the meaning of the wristwatch gets reframed as a platform for a 
connected ecosystem of applications, the field is poised to face a profound existential question. Apple’s 
smartwatch launch in 2015 was at first observed with intriguing eyes, but its first sales results leave little doubt 
of the possible magnitude of its impact. In its first fiscal year, it is likely to become the 3rd biggest watchmaker 
by value, with a projected turnover of more than US$ 5 billion (Vontobel Equity Research, 2015).  
Several Swiss companies had decided to act like Slyde, Montblanc, Frédérique Constant, Tissot, or Swatch Zero. 
These actors created locally connected watches but in a closed platform with only in-house developed 
applications. This seems of limited interest given consumer analogies with smartphones and their large 
ecosystem of applications. As of November 2015, the only Swiss actor that decided to break industry 
conventions and to engage in an innovative collaboration is TAG Heuer, part of LVMH. The company partnered 
with Intel and Google to co-develop and launch TAG Heuer Connected. It integrated an Intel processor that 
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connects to the internet and runs applications via Google’s Android Wear Platform. The watch is currently 
manufactured in the United States, not having as such the Swiss Made label, and shows only a Swiss 
Engineered sign. The company is announcing the watch at a retail price of US$ 1500 with a two-year warranty, 
giving clients an option to pay an extra US$ 1500 at the end of this period to get a hand-crafted Swiss Made 
TAG Heuer watch (Le Point Montres, 2015). 
In the United States, Fossil, the 4th biggest world watchmaker, has launched the Fossil Q line of smartwatches, 
collaborating as well with Intel and Google. It hopes it will be the engine of substantial growth in the years to 
come; and its acquisition of Misfit, a maker of wearable activity trackers, is a sign in this direction (Wired, 
2015).  
In the meanwhile, Apple, the only player in the smartwatch field to control both the hardware and the 
software, announced in September 2015 a partnership with Hermès, the French leather goods company, to 
launch the “Apple Watch Hermès” with Hermès leather straps. Since Hermès also has its own watches line, this 
is a clear coopetition move where Apple looks to strengthen its “luxury” credentials and Apple to raise 
awareness with a younger connected clientele, among other benefits.  
One can therefore take it that these cases provide empirical evidence that in a “turbulent” context, when the 
whole common shared ground is in motion, collaborative strategies among dissimilar organisations in a field 
are advisable. The cases also raise the question of where the locus of value creation in the field is located. 
Under which conditions can a company seeking to position itself in the changing ground of value creation in the 
field move its distinctive competences (Teece and Pisano, 1994) from the “hardware” to the “(connected) 
software”? At which stage of perception of turbulence, firm’s value creation locus moves from the industry to 
the field (e.g. triggers for field-level strategizing initiatives similar to the Swissness draft legislation)? Which role 
culture plays in this shift?  
 
Concluding Comments 
We have examined the Swiss watchmaking field to demonstrate that socio-ecological strategy principles and 
strategic stances have been used to attempt to fare well in the current turbulent context.  
This is the first empirical examination of these stances; and the analysis is novel to, and useful for, the 
watchmaking field.  
As the field becomes turbulent, some of our analysis are tentative and incomplete; they are based on partial 
evidence and fragmented information. This is both a strength and a limitation of this study.  
Our analysis also raises interesting research questions. Hoffmann and Lecamp (2015) presented four innovation 
strategies for independent luxury companies to endure in the current context. They analysed the cases of HYT 
and MB&F, companies that are developing coopetition strategies at the research and retail levels, respectively. 
To which extent will these coopetitive modes remain resilient in these turbulent conditions?  
Ashby (1968) mentioned that the principle of requisite variety is a necessary condition to deal with complex 
environments. To which extent does this hold true for the Swiss watchmakers and how can researchers 
measure it?  
Also, Ramirez and Selsky (2014) identify that attending to turbulent environments requires a growing role for 
futures methods like scenario planning. Ramirez et al. (2015) proposed that scenarios are a suitable 
methodology to uncover “interesting” insights. Empirical research to further explore the interest of scenarios 
remains to be done, and the creative industries field may well be a good testing ground to assess this.   
A final issue deserving exploration involves the time frames involved in strategizing. For a field that praises 
timelessness (according to the iconic Patek Philippe slogan, “You never actually own a Patek 
Philippe. You merely look after it for the next generation), turbulence appears to be accelerating time. Time has 
received increased attention in the literature, as exemplified by Kaplan and Orlikowski (2013) and Lord et al. 
(2015). How might these perspectives apply to the watchmaking industry and the creative industries in 
turbulence, and in socio-ecological strategy remains to be explored. 
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